Friday, September 23, 2005

The Difference

Back in this August 15 post, I speculated that the Nats would need to go 27-18 in their last 45 games to reach 89 wins and have a shot at the playoffs. With 9 games left, we have gone 16-20, which is 6 games behind the pace we needed (i.e. a 27-18 pace over 36 games is a record of 22-14). Had we kept pace, we'd be 1 game ahead of the Astros right now for the wild card, and 1 game behind the Braves for the division.

The question is: Which 6 games are the difference? Can we find 6 games that could have very easily gone the other way? Here's my list:

(1) Losing to the Padres 8-5 on Sept. 17 -- No comment necessary
(2) Losing to the Giants 4-3 on Sept. 20 -- Livan can't go the distance.
(3) Losing to the Mets 1-0 on August 18 -- This killed our momentum out of the Phillies series.
(4) Losing to the Braves 9-7 on Sept. 11 -- True, this was an unexpected comeback, but with 2 outs, you have to put that one away.
(5) Losing to the Padres 2-1 on Sept. 18 -- Once we lost the lead, I was convinced we'd lose, but this was a winnable game.
(6) Losing to the Mets 9-8 on August 19 -- Given the Mets' September collapse, we should not have let them wriggle out of this one.

That's it for me. I can't find anymore "bad" losses than that. The 2 losses agains the Reds are inexcusable, but I didn't think we were in those games, or deserved to win them. There were a couple of lucky wins, too, the 8-6 comeback over the Braves and the blown save against the Phils that we won in extras 5-4.

In this sense, it's hard for me to be too disappointed. Sure these games could have gone the other way, but it's not obvious that that should have been the result. We certainly didn't play like a playoff team down the stretch, and, as a result, we aren't one.

Sunday, September 18, 2005

The PETCO Commission Report

Editor's Note: Sudden, catastrophic disasters, as we have seen the past few weeks, are greeted these days with shock, sadness and concern, followed almost immediately with finger-pointing, the blame game, and calls for an "independent commission" to get to the bottom of it all. This being Washington, we should treat last night's Nats disaster and the devastation it wrought no differently. The initial shock and concern can be felt here; below you will find the results of the official process of recrimination that normally follows tragic events like this one.

Introduction

The Commission, named after the site of the tragic events of September 17, thoroughly reviewed the testimony and evidence related to that horrible evening. Based on this exhaustive review, we feel confident that no other conclusions that those expressed below can be made about the culpability of those officials involved in the disaster. We also provide concrete actions that must be taken immediately in order to safeguard the Nationals interest and reduce the chance that such a catastrophe would happen again. To fail to implement these recommendations would be so reckless, so cavalier about the real dangers faced, that it would be legally, morally and ethically wrong.

Conclusions

Based on the testimony of Mr. Bergmann, the first official on the scene, it is clear that he was given neither the resources nor the opportunity to ensure that the first embers of this tragic conflagration were squelched early. Despite having thown only 11 pitches, 7 of them for strikes, his superiors removed him his post, ostensibly due to the walk he issued. At the time he left the game, there was one out and a runner on first, but Mr. Bergmann had just stuck out a batter, and seemed in control of the situation. Further evidence revealed that Mr. Bergmann is a young, up and coming official, and that his superiors have had problems with such younger staff, often discriminating against them. It is the Commission's view that Mr. Bergmann's removal is another instance of such discrimination, as it does not have any independent, objective rationale.
Mr. Bergmann was replaced by Mr. Eischen, a colorful fellow who provided some moments of levity to our otherwise somber proceedings. Mr. Eischen has many more years of experience in these situations than Mr. Bergmann, but he is not clearly better at dealing with them. Yet even the veteran Mr. Eischen was shackled and stunted by his superiors in his efforts to contain the danger. He threw only 3 pitches, 2 for strikes, and retired the first batter he faced, but exacerbated the problem a bit by giving up a single. Yet, like Mr. Bergmann his superiors removed him from the post, for reasons that remain inexplicable.

The Commission called a leading statistician to analyze the danger at the moment Mr. Eischen had retired his first batter. His research and testimony indicated that at that point, there was only a 0.15% chance that the calamity that in fact ensued should have ensued. The vast remoteness of this possibility makes the subsequent actions of those in charge all the more blameworthy.

Mr. Eischen's replacement, a Mr. Hughes, is another younger, less experienced official who has struggled to fit in with organizations more elderly higher-ups. Looking somewhat confused by the atmosphere of instability and chaos created by all the changes to personnel dealing with the problem, Mr. Hughes threw 2 pitches, giving up a single that scored the first Padres run.

Although the situation was by no means grave (our statistician said the likelihood of disaster was only around 1.35% at that point), the senior officials panicked, bringing in Mr. Cordero to replace Mr. Hughes. Mr. Cordero, despite being only 23 years old, is an extremely competent official, often brought in to resolve the most difficult and demanding situations. It appears, however, that Mr. Cordero might have been in the middle of "burning out", given the high levels of stress he has experienced, and it was clear that the night of the tragedy Mr. Cordero was not scheduled to work, and had been looking forward to the rest. His supervisors, though, were oblivious to these facts, and thrust Mr. Cordero into a very difficult situation, exacerbated by the quixotic, hapazard decisionmaking that preceded his appointment. As one observer noted, "the whole affair seemed to create more tension than the situation called for." (Svrugla, Exh. 45A at 2)

Mr. Cordero, it must be said, did not perform up to his expected level of performance, and he was the last official on the scene, he certainly bears a not insubstantial share of the burden for the tragic events that unfolded, particularly the dramatic grand slam that has captured so much of the public's attention as the central devastating event of this disaster. But the Commission's view is that the fireworks of that event overshadows the more important, systemic flaws and failures that lead to the disaster.

Responsibility for those systemic flaws and failures must be lain at the feet of the director of the agency, Mr. Frank Robinson, who, in the Commission's view, not only was negligent in his duty, but was so reckless in his actions that it is not unreasoanable to conclude that he might have had an intention to cause the harm that ultimately resulted. Anyone, even unsophisticaed, troglodyte "jockjaws" who spend most of their time on teh Internet had identified the danger that Mr. Robinson's actions were creating.

It is the Commission's view that Mr. Robinson's actions on that fateful evening were based not on an objective assessment of the situation at hand, but on personal vendettas against younger players, which he has harbored and acted on in the past, plus his authoritative, retributive style of placing discipline, particularly of Messrs. Bergmann, Eischen and Hughes, ahead of a goal of ensuring that the danger was alleviated. There was also some evidence that Mr. Robinson was not entirely in control of his mental faculties during the tragedy -- he spent the entire game huddled in a long-sleeve jacket zipped to his chin, despite a game-time temperature in the 70s. Mr. Robinson can also be faulted for refusing to implement modernization procedures that would have improved his ability to analyze situations in a more calm, objective and productive manner. The Commission was ably assisted in its work by the testimony of Mr. Needham on this point.

Other evidence indicated that Mr. Robinson delegated far too much authority to a Mr. Rodriguez, a subordinate hopelessly out of his depth for the tasks given him. It is the Commission's view that Mr. Rodriguez was responsible for the removal of Messrs. Bergmann, Eischen and Hughes, as Mr. Rodriguez has been known to adhere to the left/right doctrine so inflexibily as to cause more harm than good.

The Commission is also disappointed by the lack of leadership at the very top of the Nationals agency. Had Congress identified and appointed a committed leader in advance of September 17, there is a chance that negligent officials like Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez could have been removed before they created the dangerous conditions for the PETCO disaster.

In sum, the Commission is strongly convinced of the view that the disaster of September 17 at PETCO Park could have easily been avoided, and that Messrs. Robinson and Rodriguez not only failed to react in a timely and appropriate manner to a perceived danger, but actually took steps to exacerabate the danger and create hazards where there were none before.

Recommendations

In order for the likelihood of tragedies like September 17 from happening again to our Nationals, it is imperative that the following steps be taken:

Messrs. Bergmann, Eischen and Hughes should be absolved of any responsibility for the tragic events. Indeed, they should be given commendations for attempting to perform under the chaotic conditions created by Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Cordero presents a more difficult case. There is no question that had he performed up to expectations, the catastrophe that befell the Nationals would not have occurred. However, the Commission is of the view that Mr. Cordero was not placed in a position where the normal expectations could be maintained. Mr. Cordero should receive a censure, but nothing more.

Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez should be removed from their posts immediately, and criminal charges should be brought against them. After the conviction which is sure to follow, a serious penalty be imposed, including, without limitation, removal of a limb or limbs, or reassignment to the Baltimore or Bronx field offices.

Thursday, September 15, 2005

What Have I Done?


I think I have created a monster. My four-year-old son is obsessed with baseball. He reads the sports page religiously every morning, and has taught himself to read all thirty team names and nicknames. He knows the difference between the NL and the AL. He knows who the Nats are competing with for the playoffs, so he'll say "Dad! Dad! This is good! Brewers 6, Astros 4!" In the car on Sunday with XM, he was requesting which games to listen to; he had memorized the schedule for the day. He likes the Nats first, but also the Brewers, Rockies, and Tigers. He doesn't like being a frontrunner.

But today, he surpassed even all this. I came home and told him the Nats/Mets score. "Woo hoo!", he said, "That's three in a row against the Mets. The Mets aren't very good. Who do the Nats play tomorrow?" I told him the San Diego Padres. "Is that game on late?" he asked. "Yes, at 10 o'clock" I said. He frowned, "So that will be an x-late game in the paper, huh? Today, all the teams in the NL West had an x next to their names." I didn't know what to say.

Wednesday, September 07, 2005

With Apologies to T.S. Eliot

This is the way the season ends.
This is the way the season ends.
This is the way the season ends.
Not with a "Bang! Zoom!" but with a whimper.

Trivia Question

What do these teams have in common: Baltimore, Cleveland, Toronto, Detroit, Oakland, Texas, Milwaukee, Chicago Cubs, Cincinnati, Washington, Florida, NY Mets, Philadelphia?

Answer in the first comment.

Tuesday, September 06, 2005

ERV Boxscore for September 6, vs. Florida

Not much to say here. Darrell Rasner passed his initiation into the "arsonists", the club of journeyman starting pitchers who seem to have no chance of winning a game. Though, in this game, the experienced bullpen came through to douse the flames and hold the Marlins to 4 runs, which should be enough to win. But our offense went sour (why is Cristian Guzman playing? I thought we got D. Cruz to replace him) and we lose.

ERV Win: Moehler
ERV Loss: Drasner

3 Most Valuable Plays:

(1) Wilkerson's HR in the 3rd (1.90)
(2) Castillo's HR in the 5th (1.53)
(3) Hermida's double in the 3rd (1.33)

Monday, September 05, 2005

ERV Boxscore for September 5, vs. Florida

The good news and bad news about this game center around the same thing: our big three pitchers did the job this holiday weekend, winning three crucial games and putting us back in the mix. But they can't pitch anymore for a bit; we now we enter the abyss that is the back-end of our rotation. CBS Sportsline says it's Armas and Halama the next two nights. (Edit: I am a nervous ninny. We'll be fine. Today's paper says we have Darrell Rasner going tonight. I'm so relieved.) It would be an accomplishment to get one of those two next games.

ERV Win: Hernandez
ERV Loss: LoDuca and Encarnacion

3 Most Valuable Plays:
(1) LoDuca's GIDP in the 5th (-1.60)
(2) Hernandez's GIDP in the 6th (-1.56)
(3) Encarnacion's GIDP in the 7th (-1.49)

Sunday, September 04, 2005

Our Magic Number

After a very solid win today, one of the best in quite a while, it's time to start tracking our magic number. But we're not in any lead, you might say, how can we calculate a magic number? It's easy. Take the number of games remaining, add 1, then add the number of games your team is behind in the loss column. Here it is for the Nats, relative to winning the division: 25 games remaining, plus 1, plus 7 for the games behind the Braves in the loss column. So our magic number for winning the division is 33. Every time the Nats win, it goes down by one. Every time the Braves lose, it goes down by one. So, even if we won all of our remaining 25 games, we'd need the Braves to lose at least 8 games to win the division.

But what about the other teams between us and the Braves? How do we figure them into the magic number? Well, we don't, for now. They come into play if the Braves drop out of the lead. At that point, we figure our magic number based on the new leading team's loss total.

For the Wild Card, we have 25 remaining games, plus 1, plus 2 games behind the Phils in the loss column, so our magic number is 28 games for the Wild Card.

We'll be tracking this in the sidebar, replacing the Playoff Pace section with the Magic Number section.

Saturday, September 03, 2005

What is St. Barry Trying to Tell Us?

Barry Svrugla, the Nats beat writer who has been consistently excellent this year, has a very good story today about a very bad game for the Nats, and he tells us a lot about particular players in a very subtle way. Notice, for example, how the mere juxtaposition of two descriptions conveys a lot:

Afterward, in the clubhouse, outfielder Brad Wilkerson was asked about the mood of the team.
"I think it's getting a little ridiculous, to tell you the truth," Wilkerson said. "Hopefully -- I keep saying 'hopefully' -- we can get some momentum, get some confidence. But I think we got to want it. We got to realize what we're playing for. We're playing [teams] we're going to be going up against in the wild card.

"But now's the time. Now's the time to want it more than anything. And if we give it all we have and come up short, I can go home this offseason and work on next year. But if I had to go home right now, I wouldn't feel that way."

In the back of a nearly empty locker room, as Wilkerson spoke, Castilla joked with pitcher Esteban Loaiza, laughing loudly. Castilla was asked if he thought the team could still contend.

"How many games are left?" he asked. Twenty-seven, he was told. "Yeah, we're still in it," he responded. "We still got a chance."


Also interesting is that in my hardcopy version of the paper, the quote from Vinny Castilla is not in the story, just the description of his joking with Loaiza. One gets the feeling that Barry or his editor thought, "Maybe it would be best if we get a response from Vinny." Which makes pretty clear what Barry was trying to tell us.